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Abstract
While online shopping are becoming more accepted by
people in modern life, cardholders are more concerned
about card fraud and the lack of cardholder authentication
in the current online credit card payment. This paper pro-
poses a purchase protocol with live cardholder authentica-
tion for online transaction which combines telephone bank-
ing and online banking together. The order information and
payment information are sent though the Internet and en-
crypted by asymmetric key encryption. The cardholder is
authenticated by the card issuing bank ringing back to the
customer’s phone number and the cardholder inputting the
secure PIN and the amount to pay. The live cardholder
authentication makes the cardholder feel securer and card
fraud difficult. Furthermore, the protocol does not require
the cardholder to obtain a public key certificate or install
additional software for the online transaction.
Keywords— online credit card payment, card fraud, au-
thentication
1. Introduction
When a cardholder presents his credit card at a retailer
shop, the card is read by a card reader and the cardholder is
required to input a PIN. After the PIN is verified, the trans-
action is approved to go ahead. The possession of the four-
digit PIN is used to authenticate the cardholder. Before the
use of Chip and PIN, cardholder signature was used in the
past but is replaced by Chip and PIN because it is easier to
forge a signature than guessing a PIN.
The process is different when a credit card is used online.
Most online shopping sites only require the input of card de-
tails including the three digits at the back of the card. An-
other person other than the cardholder may get hold of the
information and use it shopping online. The lack of card-
holder authentication in the current online payment has re-
sulted in online shopping fraud being one of the major card
fraud. Cardholders are becoming more concerned about re-
leasing their card information. Secure protocols are needed
to enhance the security of online shopping.
Ideally, a secure protocol for online transaction should
provide mutual authentication of a customer and a mer-
chant; that is to authenticate that a cardholder is a legitimate
user of a payment card account, and that a merchant can
accept a payment card transactions. In addition, the pay-
ment information should be always confidential and data
integrity should be ensured. Apart from the requirements in
the aspects of security, an online credit card payment sys-
tem should also be easy to deploy in real world without bur-
dening the card issuer, the merchant and the cardholder too
much. The system must be easy to use for the cardholder
who chooses online shopping initially for the benefits of its
convenience. The protocol should also let the cardholder
feel secure.
Many solutions have been proposed for thwarting credit
card fraud [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Among them [2, 3, 5], the
common way of authenticating a cardholder is to use dig-
ital signature based on the public key infrastructure (PKI).
This requires the cardholder to have a public key certificate
before commencing an online purchase, which makes the
task at cardholder side impractical and inconvenient. As a
result, the cardholder authentication is omitted in some of
the schemes [3, 4].
This paper is motivated by providing a purchase protocol
with live cardholder authentication in online purchase pro-
cedure similar to the Chip and PIN used at the onsite shop-
ping. It combines telephone banking and online banking
together. The order information and payment information
are sent though the Internet and encrypted using asymmet-
ric key encryption. The cardholder authentication is done
through the public switched telephone network (PSTN) by
the card issuing bank ringing back to the customer’s contact
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phone number and requesting the input of the secure PIN
and the amount to pay.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
discusses the related work in online payment schemes. Sec-
tion 3 presents the protocol including its assumptions, no-
tations and major phases. Section 4 evaluates the protocol
and finally section 4 summarizes the paper.
2. Related Work
The Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol [5]
was devised by Visa and Mastercard; it achieves high secu-
rity by five sub-protocols together: cardholder registration,
merchant registration, purchase request, payment authoriza-
tion, and payment capture. SET requires all participation
entities including the cardholder to have a public key cer-
tificate before a purchase. Because of the complicity and
high overhead of the protocol and its dependency on the
PKI, SET has not been implemented in the industry after its
design in 1997.
Different from the SET, credit card payment using Se-
cure Socket Layer (SSL) [3] is widely accepted in e-
business. SSL provides data confidentiality by using sym-
metric key encryption which is faster than the public key
encryption, and merchant authentication by digital signa-
ture. The authentication of the cardholder is seldom de-
ployed since a cardholder usually does not have a public
key certificate. Nevertheless, using symmetric key encryp-
tion enables the merchant to access the payment details of
the cardholder and in many cases store such information in
its database. Once the database is tampered, the lost data
may cause more cases of card fraud.
Recently, PayPal [6] has been popular among cardhold-
ers because it does not require the input of card details on-
line. Instead, a valid email address is considered as a PayPal
account identifier and used for online payment. However,
PayPal has poor authentication during its registration phase
phase through which the payment information such as card
details or account number and sort code are associated with
a valid email address. Once the association is created, us-
ing the valid email address and the correct password will
make the bank account or credit card to pay for a purchase.
An attacker Eve may easily register by Bob’s bank account
details and her email address, and get Bob to pay for her
shoppings later on.
Another effort to avoid repetitively use of card details is
to use one-time credit card transaction number (CCT) [4]. A
CTT is used only once, thereby whether the CCT is stored
by the merchant or stolen by an attacker does not matter
after its use. The concern is that CCTs do not provide au-
thentication of the cardholder. The current CCT in use is
stored on the credit card, and once the card is inserted into a
card reader, a new CCT will be calculated based on a secret
stored on the card and known to the issuing bank. The issu-
ing bank can verify which card is being used but not who is
using the card.
3. The Purchase Protocol with Live Card-
holder Authentication
3.1. Assumptions
It is assumed that a cardholder trusts the branded bank
that issues him a credit card. He has to if he is willing to
deposit his money in the bank. When obtaining a credit
card the cardholder has given his personal information to
the bank such as identity, date of birth, addresses, contact
email address, and contact telephone number(s). The finan-
cial and personal information is kept safely by the bank.
The bank gives the customer a Personal Information Num-
ber (PIN) to use. Of course, initially, the bank has authenti-
cated the cardholder by his identification document such as
driving licence, passport and billing address.
It is also assumed that a PKI exists to facilitate the pro-
tocol. All the business entities including merchants, pay-
ment gateways, card issuing banks, and merchant acquiring
banks have registered with some Certificate Authority (CA)
and been issued public key certificates. The CA or a cluster
of CAs are trusted by all the business entities. The honesty
of a merchant should have been checked during the regis-
tration procedure (which is actually a bit risky). A cautious
customer always checks a merchant’s recent credit before
deciding to buy a good from the merchant online. These en-
tities should have at least two private and public key pairs;
one used for encryption and the other for signature. The
business entities know the public keys of one another.
It is not assumed that a cardholder has obtained a public
key certificate before purchasing online because it is im-
practical to ask all the cardholders to do so. However, a
cardholder trusts the CAs that issue the public key certifi-
cates for the business entities. The cardholder does not have
to know the public keys of the business entities.
3.2. The Purchase Protocol
Figure 1 plots the sequence of the purchase protocol
which includes five phases:
1. Purchase request: the cardholder initializes a purchase
request and sends it to the merchant. This is done in
step S.1.
2. Authorization and authentication request: the mer-
chant processes the purchase request and sends an au-
thorization and authentication request to the payment
gateway. This is done in step S.2.
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Figure 1. The purchase protocol with live authentication
3. Authorization and authentication: the payment gate-
way processes the authorization and authentication re-
quest, passes it to the card issuing bank who then
authenticates the cardholder through the PSTN. This
phase includes steps S.3, S.4, and S.5.
4. Authorization and authentication response: The card
issuing bank sends an authorization and authentication
response back to the payment gateway who then in-
structs the merchant acquiring bank and the merchant.
This phase includes steps S.6, S.7 and S.8.
5. Purchase response: The merchant sends an purchase
response back to the cardholder. This is done in step
S.9.
The above phases are explained in details below. The
notations in use are listed in Table 1.
Phase 1: Purchase Request.
(S.1) The cardholder browsers the merchant’s shopping
site and finds the goods that he wants to buy. When the
payment information pops out, he fills in his credit card in-
formation. When the cardholder clicks the “submit” button,
a Java applet is downloaded from the merchant’s shopping
site – we call it a payment applet. When the payment ap-
plet is downloaded to the cardholder site, it obtains from the
merchant site the public keys of the payment gateway and
the merchant, and a nounce that serves as a globally unique
Table 1. Notations
C Cardholder
M Merchant
P Payment gateway
CardB Card issuing bank
pubEK Encryption key of a private public key pair
priSK Signing key of a private public key pair
XID Global unique transaction ID
OrderInfo Order information
PayInfo Payment information
PurAmt Purchase amount
OIEncrypt Encrypted order details
PIEncrypt Encrypted payment details
CardSign Cardholder signatures
auCode Authorization and authentication code
transaction identifier. The payment applet also generates an
asymmetric key pair for the cardholder since it is assumed
that the cardholder may not have an issued certificate as the
merchant and the payment gateway. The asymmetric key
pair is used for providing the integrity of the order and pay-
ment information but not for authenticating the cardholder.
The payment applet sends the order and the payment in-
formation to the merchant’s shopping site using dual en-
cryption to ensure that the merchant can only read the order
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details but not the payment details.
C− > M : OIEncrypt, PIEncrypt, CardSign (1)
where the payment applet has computed the following.
OIEncrypt =
CryptpubEK
M
(XID, OrderInfo, pubSKC ,
Hash(XID, PayInfo, PurAmt)) (2)
PIEncrypt =
CryptpubEK
P
(XID, PayInfo, PurAmt, pubSKC ,
Hash(XID, OrderInfo)) (3)
CardSign =
SignpriSK
C
(Hash(XID, OrderInfo),
Hash(XID, PayInfo, PurAmt)) (4)
The encrypted order details are shown in (2). The pay-
ment applet first combines the globally unique transac-
tion identifier, the payment information which includes the
credit card number, expire date, cardholder name, etc, and
the purchase amount that the cardholder needs to pay. It
then calculates the hash of the combination, and concate-
nates the hash value with the transaction identifier, the or-
der information that may include goods description, price,
etc, and the verification key of the cardholder. The payment
applet then encrypts the concatenation by the public key of
the merchant’s encryption key pair.
As shown in (3), the encrypted payment details are in
a similar format as the encrypted order details. The pay-
ment applet combines the transaction identifier and the or-
der information, and calculates the hash of the combina-
tion. The payment applet then concatenates the hash value
with the transaction identifier, the payment information, the
purchase amount that the cardholder needs to pay, and the
verification key of the cardholder. Similarly, the payment
applet encrypts everything by the public key of the payment
gateway’s encryption key pair.
(4) expresses the cardholder signature on the hash values
of the order details and the payment details. The hash
values are duplicated in the signature, the encrypted order
details, and the encrypted payment details, so that various
parties can verify the integrity of the information. By this
way, although the payment details are kept secret to the
merchant, and the payment gateway merchant does not
know what the pay is for, either of them is able to verify the
integrity of the piece of information that is only known to
the other.
Phase 2: Authorization and Authentication Request.
(S.2) After receiving the purchase request, the merchant
decrypts the encrypted order details, and verifies the in-
tegrity of the order details by calculating the hash value of
the order details and then comparing the value with the one
contained in the cardholder’s signature. The merchant also
verifies the hash value of the payment details by comparing
the two values of the payment details in the encrypted order
details and the cardholder’s signature.
If the verifications are successful, the merchant com-
bines the transaction identity, the encrypted payment details
which it cannot read, the cardholder’s signature, the hash
value of the order details, and the verification key of the
cardholder. The merchant signs everything, encrypts its sig-
nature using the payment gateway’s public key, and sends
the encrypted message to the payment gateway (5).
M− > P :
CryptpubEK
P
(SignpriSK
M
(XID, PIEncrypt,
CardSign, Hash(XID, OrderInfo), pubSKC ))
(5)
Phase 3: Authorization and Authentication
(S.3) The payment gateway decrypts the encrypted pay-
ment details by using its own private key and the public key
of the merchant. It calculates the hash value of the payment
details and compares it with the one supplied in the card-
holder’s signature. The payment gateway also verifies the
integrity of the order details by comparing the hash value
from the decrypted message and the one contained in the
cardholder’s signature. Successful verifications show that
the cardholder and the merchant agree on the transaction.
The payment gateway then combines the global transac-
tion identifier, the payment information and the purchase
amount. It calculates the hash of the combinations, and
signs the hash value. The payment gateway concatenates
the combination and the signature, and encrypts the con-
catenation by the credit card issuing bank’s public key. The
encrypted message is forwarded to the issuing bank (6).
P− > CardB :
CryptpubEK
CardB
(XID, PayInfo, PurAmt,
SignpriSK
P
(Hash(XID, PayInfo, PurAmt)))
(6)
(S.4) After receiving the authorization and authentica-
tion request, the card issuing bank checks the payment de-
tails of the cardholder in its database and finds the contact
number of the cardholder. The bank rings back to the card-
holder’s prime phone number which is a land line or a mo-
bile phone, and asks the cardholder to confrim the transac-
tion by inputting the PIN of the credit card and the purchase
amount of the transaction.
(S.5) The cardholder inputs the PIN through the number
pad on his phone as he does on a card reader in a retail
shopping site, press #, and then inputs the purchase amount
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omitting the numbers after the decimal point, and press #
again to end the confirmation. Data is sent through PSTN
provided by the telephone service provider.
The protocol authenticates the cardholder by four
conditions: the correct credit card details, use of the right
telephone, correct PIN, and correct purchase amount.
Missing any of these conditions will make the transaction
unsuccessful. The input of the correct purchase amount
allows the cardholder to tell for which purchase this
confirmation is in case that the cardholder has used the
same card twice in a short time.
Phase 4: Authorization and Authentication Response.
(S.6) The issuing bank sends an authorization and au-
thentication code back to the payment gateway if it receives
the right PIN and right purchase amount back though the
PSTN. If the PIN is wrong, a response code is sent back
and used to denote any error that might have had occurred
during the verification or transaction process (7).
CardB− > P :
CryptpubEK
P
(XID, PurAmt, auCode,
SignpriSK
CardB
(hash(XID, PurAmt, auCode)))
(7)
(S.7) The payment gateway schedules debiting the card-
holder’s account and crediting the merchant’s acquiring ac-
count.
(S.8) The payment gateways sends the authorization and
authentication code to the merchant shopping site to inform
the merchant to be ready to issue the goods (8).
P− > M :
CryptpubEK
M
(XID, PurAmt, auCode,
SignpriSK
P
(hash(XID, PurAmt, auCode)))
(8)
Phase 5:Purchase Response.
(S.9) The merchants shopping site generates feedback
based on the authorization / response code received by the
payment gateway. Some of the codes may be interpreted as:
“You card has been billed.”,“Insufficient funds.” or “Incor-
rect PIN.”.
4. Evaluation of the Protocol
4.1. Security
Confidentiality of the message is provided by asymmet-
ric key encryption. The messages are always encrypted by
the receiver’s public key in its encryption key pair. This
is based on the assumption that the business entities either
know each other’s public key at the moment of the trans-
action or can obtain the public key through other channels
when necessary. The order details are just known to the
cardholder and the merchant. More importantly, the pay-
ment details are known to the cardholder, the payment gate-
way and the card issuing bank only, making the merchant
impossible to store the card information in its database.
This avoids card frauds in case of an attack is mounted on
the database.
Integrity of the order details and the payment details is
assured by the payment applet at the cardholder side signing
the hash values of the order details and the payment details.
The merchant and the payment gateway verify both the hash
values of the order details and payment details separately
although either of them can only read the order details or
the payment details alone. The verification key of the card-
holder is encrypted and sent to the merchant and payment
gateway. Integrity of the data exchanged between the pay-
ment gateway and the card issuing bank is provided by the
signature on the hash value of the data.
Authentication of the cardholder is done through PSTN.
The cardholder needs to pick up the phone call from the
bank at the prime contact number that he has given to the
bank initially or updated afterwards. He then keys in the
correct PIN and the correct purchase amount omitting the
numbers after the decimal point. If the phone number is a
fixed line, it makes a card fraud difficult unless someone
breaks into the house. Choosing a mobile phone number
makes the online shopping mobile and more convenient, but
it has the risk that the cardholder may lose his credit card
and mobile phone together. In this case the authentication
only lies in the confidentiality of the PIN. Authentication of
the merchant is through its signature on the hash value of
the message to be sent. This is the same for the payment
gateway and the card issuing bank.
4.2. Usability
The protocol keeps the functions at the customer side
as simple as possible. It does not require a cardholder to
obtain a public key certificate or install any software for the
purpose of online shopping. The cardholder should accept
the PIN authentication process easily because it is similar to
the process of onsite shopping. The live verification process
also gives the cardholder a sense of security.
The deployment of the protocol requires a PKI for the
business entities. It also requires the card issuing bank to
call back at the cardholder’s primary phone number stored
in its database and verifies the PIN and purchase amount
inputted by the cardholder. These functions are deployable
at the bank side with reasonable cost.
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4.3. Attack
To mount a card fraud attack in the protocol, an attacker
must know the card details, the PIN, and the prime contact
telephone number that the cardholder leaves at the bank.
The attacker should also have control of the phone during a
purchase. The attacker might get the payment details thor-
ough packet intercepting or database stealing, he may even
get the PIN through shoulder surfing when the cardholder
inputs his PIN in a supermarket. The attacker then has to
steal the cardholder’s hand phone or break into the card-
holder’s house in order to validate the authentication and
authorization, which a high technology attacker normally
doesn’t like to do. Alternatively the attacker may attempt
the PSTN, but it is not easy attempting the PSTN thanks to
its closed architecture. It is assumed that the calling back
is done through the traditional PSTN but not voice over IP
(VoP).
5. Summary
Current online credit card payment is not secure due to
its lack of cardholder authentication. This paper proposes
a purchase protocol with live authentication of cardholder
for online credit card payment which combines telephone
banking and online banking together. The protocol has five
phases: (1) purchase request, (2) authorization and authenti-
cation request, (3) authorization and authentication, (4) au-
thorization and authentication response, and (5) purchase
response. The order information and payment information
are sent though the Internet and encrypted by asymmetric
key encryption. The protocol authenticates the cardholder
by the card issuing bank ringing back to the customer’s con-
tact phone number and the cardholder inputting the secure
PIN and the price to pay. The live authentication of card-
holder makes a cardholder feel securer and card fraud dif-
ficult. Furthermore, the cardholder does not need to obtain
a public key certificate or install additional software for the
transaction.
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